Actions in games that address economic environments such as auctions and oligopoly games are typically costly, and signals, or types, are interdependent. Consequently, such games may not have equilibria supported by monotone strategies, monotone equilibria, see Tsirelson (1999, 2000). Derivation of pure strategy nonmonotone equilibria when types are interdependent and continuously distributed has not been explored in the literature, and it is certainly a non trivial matter; mixed-strategy equilibria pose additional problems. We address these issues by considering a contest game that can be interpreted as competition for research funds or jobs.
Introduction
A negative result established in Tsirelson (1999, 2000) claims that a large class of symmetric games, including many types of auctions as well as the model considered in this paper, do not have monotone equilibria, unless the correlation between signals, bidding cost or the number of players is sufficiently small. This result poses serious questions about equilibria in this class of games. Since non-monotone equilibria in games under incomplete information, continuously distributed and interdependent signals (which is the class considered) is an unexplored terrain, it is not clear how to proceed if one wishes to establish uniqueness of equilibrium and investigate which strategies support it.
Groping our way in the dark, it is prudent not to proceed with full generality, but advance gradually to get an insight, first. To implement this advice, we note that the non-monotonicity established by L&T originates in participation. Therefore, we chose to investigate non-monotone equilibria in models that focus on participation, leaving aside bidding strategies. To further simplify the analysis, we give away the idea of considering a large class of signal distributions, and assume the multinormal distribution with a positive correlation coefficient ρ. This is certainly the most natural and well-investigated distribution for correlated random variables.
1 Restricting attention to this 'simple' setting do we end up with a trivial problem; we leave it to the reader to pass the judgement.
Consequently, we consider a setting in which n players privately observe signals (types), and must then decide whether they want to participate in a game. Participation is costly, and signals are truly disclosed to the principal who runs the contest. Participants in the game are players that were willing to incur participation cost, c. The participant with the highest signal gets a prize, C. Signals are interdependent and the prize is constant. Such a model is different from an auction since there is no bidding strategy; participants are truthful. This assumption is well supported by some real life situations noted below. Consequently, the only strategic variable is participation.
There are many situations that correspond to this model to which we refer as a contest. Bidding for research funds is one example; players must decide if they want to participate, which is costly. Each player submits his signal that corresponds to his research record and the player with the highest signal is the winner and gets the prize. Competing for academic, or other, jobs is another example; the job is the prize. In all these cases it is assumed that types are given and are truthfully reported, being supported by verifiable and documented facts, like a curriculum vitae. The setting we consider does not apply to many contests that take place in reality in which participants can affect their types (signals) by exerting effort, see Fullerton and McAffee (1999) .
The rationale for signal dependence in situations referred to above, is that although signals such as, say, research performance could be obtained independently, the distribution that generated them is not completely known to players. One can think that each player knows the distribution up to an unknown parameter θ (state of nature). Players cope with uncertainty about θ by assuming it is a random variable with a known distribution. The uncertainty about θ induces signal dependence. Such situations are sometimes referred to as 'conditional independence'.
We prove that:
• Among all symmetric equilibria, our game has a unique equilibrium and it is in mixed strategies. It is described by a function p(·) such that a player with signal s participates with probability p(s).
• There exists a sufficiently high signal, s high , such that signals s ∈ (s high , ∞) always participate; namely, p(s) = 1 for all s ∈ (s high , ∞).
• The participation strategy p(·) is discontinuous at s high ; namely, p(s high +) = 1 but p(s high −) = ρ; that is, p(s) goes to the correlation coefficient ρ when s goes to s high from the left.
• There exists a low signal s low < s high such that on s ∈ (s low , s high ) the equilibrium participation strategy dictates randomization everywhere; namely, 0 < p(s) < 1.
• We do not know, whether s low = −∞ or not. But if s low > ∞, then the limit p(s low +) exists and is equal to 0 or 1.
• The equilibrium participation strategy, p(·) is continuous on (s low , s high ).
The equilibrium function p(·) is a solution of a nonlinear integral equation, that, most likely, does not have an explicit analytic solution. In addition to rigorously proven results, we have some observations based on numerical computations for which no generality is claimed. These results can give us indications as to some typical (if not general) properties of equilibrium that we could not address analytically.
• s low = −∞.
• The function p(·) is non-monotone on (s low , ∞). It is increasing on (s min , ∞), where s min is the minimizer of p(·), if the latter has a single minimum, or the rightmost minimizer if there are several local minima. If p(·) increases on (s low , s high ) then s min = s low . Typically, however, s min = s low .
• The interval (s min , ∞) contains most of the distribution of signals.
• If s low < s min , the function p(·) has from 1 to 3 intervals of monotonicity on the interval (s low , s min ).
Unfortunately, we were unable to establish any results for (−∞, s low ). An important structural property that emerges when participation is a strategic variable, is that strategies and the probability of winning are interdependent. This did not happen in auction models that ignored participation and had monotone equilibria. Such settings made it possible to explain the rationale of the equilibrium strategy in terms of players' assessments of their probability of winning, given their signals only (and irrespective of strategies). From a game theoretic point of view this may sound strange, but under monotonicity, it worked. The fact that this convenient property is absent from our model, is a source of much of the complexity we had to deal with.
To assess the importance of the numerical analysis note the following. Although, eventually we proved analytically that the equilibrium strategy has a 'jump' at ρ, this was done only after this property was revealed by a numerical analysis. Without that, the chances were that the analysis would have been restricted to continuous strategies. Such a restriction is common in the literature; it is based, probably, on the hope that in a model where everything is continuous, so are the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, such an assumption simplifies the mathematics. Well, had we done so, our conclusion would have been that our model does not have an equilibrium. This is so, since the model has a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is supported by a strategy that is discontinuous.
Having established that there is only one equilibrium, and it is in mixed strategies, we might have been tempted to prove that the equilibrium strategy p(s) is monotone in s; namely, that players with higher signals participate with a higher probability. This would have been our 'intelligent' guess. The numerical analysis saved us the frustration of trying to prove an incorrect conjecture. Strictly speaking, there is no monotonicity, however, the numerical analysis indicates that, typically, p(·) is monotone in s for a large segment of the distribution, including the right tail. This is an important result since this is where the winners come from.
These results illustrate, once again, the need to avoid, as much as possible, a-priori restrictions on equilibrium strategies, and also the need to do some numerics before trying to obtain general results when considering complex models.
It is worthwhile to mention that having established a unique mixed strategy equilibrium is somewhat puzzling. One might think that our model is basically a special case of an auction, except that it has a trivial bidding strategy and the winner is not required to make any payments. Therefore (?), one could hope that it allows a monotone equilibrium whenever an auction does. This, however, turns out not to be true since as shown in L&T (1999), a second price auction can have a monotone equilibrium when ρ, c or n are sufficiently small.
From a game theoretic point of view, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first model for which an equilibrium in mixed strategies was established in a game of incomplete information, with continuous types, and was shown to be the only equilibrium in the class of all symmetric equilibria. Our method of establishing a unique equilibrium may be indicative about the strings one may wish to pull to get an insight of how to solve other problems in which monotone equilibria do not exist.
Relating our paper to the existing literature, the closest is Krishna and Morgan (1997) who were the first to consider a model with interdependent signals and costly actions. In considering an all-pay auction with affiliated signals they derived conditions that are sufficient to obtain a monotone equilibrium. They were aware of the fact that when equilibria are not monotone, the currently used techniques can not be applied and it is not clear how to proceed. Applying results established in L&T (1999) and (2000), it follows that for a large number of players any conditions that are sufficient for existence of a monotone equilibrium inevitably force weak dependence between signals.
A few papers considered the case when bidders may get more information about signals at a cost, see Matthews (1984) and a more general setting in Jackson (1999) . This is certainly a realistic aspect of bidding situations, but these papers concentrated on aggregation of information and did not address participation. In similarity to our paper, they considered interdependent signals, which is a crucial element.
There are more papers that investigated the effect of bidding cost, but they did it in a setting of independent signals. Such settings allow monotone equilibria, and are therefore less related to our paper. Moreover, almost all these papers focused on problems of efficiency and not so much on partici-pation. The papers take different approach to the timing when participation cost must be incurred, and auction rules considered. In Samuelson (1985) bidding cost take place when potential bidders know their valuations, as in our paper. McAfee&McMillan (1987) and Tan (1992) consider the case where cost are incurred before potential bidders know their types. Paying at the stage of complete ignorance, has the natural interpretation of learning about ones type, which does not remove the reasons for the existence of bidding cost. Obviously, both cost may take place in the same auction; one may be willing to pay to improve the quality of his signal, and to have to incur bidding cost.
In similarity to McAfee&McMillan and Tan, Levin&Smith (1994) assume that participation cost are paid before players know their types. They were the first to model participation as part of equilibrium, and addressed the problem of efficiency and market size. Stegeman (1996) considered a more general setting; in particular, he did not restrict attention to symmetric games as do the other papers, including ours. He derived a version of the revelation principle for models where participation cost are accounted for, but, he too did not focus on participation. Lixin (2001) considered the case where players had initially private information about their types, as in Samuelson, but were allowed to further augment it, at a cost. But he, too, assumed independence of information and had therefore no problems with monotonicity. Lixin's paper concentrated on a special auction design; indicative bidding.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we present, very briefly, the essentials of the model. In Section 2 we derive the equilibrium equation. From here on, we assume multinormal signals. A unique, always participate, equilibrium was established in Section 3 for the case where the minimal participating signal was set sufficiently high. In Section 4 we establish a sequence of lemmas that are needed to isolate the equilibrium strategy. Using results established in Section 4, equilibrium is derived in Section 5; we prove its uniqueness and establish some properties. To get a certain feeling as to the properties of equilibrium, we present in Section 6 results obtained from numerical calculations. Such an analysis adds much to our understanding of the properties of equilibrium, in providing partial answers to important questions that can not be addressed analytically. In Section 7 we prove that if signals are independent there exists a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies. However, this pure strategy equilibrium disappears even at the slightest deviation from independence.
The Model
We consider a game of n risk neutral and, initially, identical players who observe their private one-dimensional signals S 1 , . . . , S n . Player k is allowed to participate if and only if his signal S k exceeds a reserve level r. In that case the player chooses an action A k , either 1 (participate) or 0 (quit). All players allowed to participate choose their actions simultaneously and independently.
2 If no one participates, all get nothing. Otherwise, each participant pays an entry cost c, and the one with the highest signal S k = max l { S l | S l > r, A l = 1 } is the winner and gets the prize, C.
3 Parameters C, c, r and the joint distribution of signals are common knowledge. Naturally, 0 < c < C < ∞.
The joint distribution of signals is assumed to be of the form
where
is a family of one-dimensional distributions parametrized by θ, and the parameter θ is drawn from its distribution G. 4 In other words, we have n + 1 random variables Θ, S 1 , . . . , S n such that
here F 1 (s) = F(s|θ) G(dθ), which is just (1.1) for n = 1. A strategy (possibly mixed) of player k is described by a function p k (·) such that
for s k ∈ (r, ∞); that is, p k (s k ) is the participation probability for player k possessing signal s k . A pure strategy corresponds to the case where p k (·) takes on two values only, 0 and 1. In general, 0 ≤ p k (s k ) ≤ 1. Nothing like monotonicity, continuity etc. is assumed; p k (·) is just a function, defined on (r, ∞) almost everywhere w.r.t. the distribution F 1 of a signal, measurable w.r.t. the same distribution, and taking on values on [0, 1]. 5 We leave p k (·) undefined on (−∞, r), since such signals exclude participation.
Actions are conditionally independent given the signals, that is,
here and henceforth s 1 , . . . , s n run over (r, ∞). 
Probability of winning and a description of equilibrium
The payoff Π k of player k is a random variable (in fact, a function of S 1 , . . . , S n , A 1 , . . . , A n ) taking on three values: 0 in the case of no participation, −c, participation but no win, and C − c, participation and win. In order to calculate the expected payoff given the signal, E Π k S k , we need first the probability of winning, given participation and signal. To this effect, we start by conditioning also on the common (random) factor Θ. To exclude ties, we assume that each F(·|θ) is continuous. Just for notational convenience, assume for a while that k = n and all signals are positive. Then, the desired probability is given by
Note that since we do not restrict strategies to be monotone, and not even pure, the probability of winning involves not just signals, S i , but also actions A i of the other potential players; consequently, the relevant random variables are products of signals and actions, A i S i , see (2.1). This is how participation strategy of players i = 1, . . . , n − 1 is needed in order to derive an expression for the probability of winning of player n. This is a natural result in a strategic situation; it was avoided in most of auction models because attention was restricted to models that had equilibria supported by monotone strategies.
Going back to (2.1), we can replace the actions A i by strategies that induced them, p(·), to obtain,
So,
The auxiliary assumption that signals are positive may be discarded now. Considering a symmetric equilibrium, we restrict ourselves to the symmetric case
, which was derived for k = n, but holds equally well for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Assuming that distributions F(·|θ) have densities F (·|θ) we use Bayes formula for densities. The conditional distribution of Θ given
where F 1 is the density of the unconditional distribution of a signal, F 1 (s) = F (s|θ) G(dθ). Therefore the winning probability
which is the probability of winning of a player who decided to participate and whose signal is s k . Note that the probability depends on strategy of players with higher signals.
The effect of θ is described by the 'winning measure' w(·|s) defined by
We have
in fact, the probability measure (1/W(s))w(dθ|s) is nothing but the conditional distribution of Θ given that S k = s k and player k wins (for a given k). So, expected profit of a participant with signal s k , is given by,
Note that the expected profit vanishes if W(s k ) = c/C, in which case the player is indifferent between participating and quitting. We are in a position to describe equilibria.
Lemma.
A participation strategy p(·) supports a symmetric equilibrium if and only if F 1 -almost all s ∈ (r, ∞) belong to one of the following three cases:
Proof. Follows immediately from (2.7) and the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
From lemma 2.8 we obtain the equation of a symmetric equilibrium; W(s) = c/C, that is, w(dθ|s) = c/C with w substituted from (2.5). However, (b) and (c) are relevant as well.
A few words are in order to identify mathematical properties of the equilibrium condition which is a non-standard integral equation. Such an identification may help readers to understand the relation between our equation and well-known integral equations, and corresponding approaches.
The equation W(s) = c/C may be written in the form
Compare it with a Volterra equation of the first kind (ϕ is the unknown function)
a Volterra equation of the second kind,
nonlinear Volterra equation
and a nonlinear equation of the Hammerstein type
(see Tricomi (1957) 
Equilibrium strategy of agents with high signals
As noted in the previous section, not restricting attention to monotone strategies only, makes the probability of winning dependent on participation strategy, which makes the a-priori assessments of probability of winning difficult, if not impossible. It is possible that the simple strategy 'never quit, always participate' (whenever allowed) supports an equilibrium, that is, the constant function, p(s) = 1 for all s ∈ (r, ∞), satisfies 2.8. One would think that such an equilibrium is reasonable at least for some, very high values of r. And in fact that happens if and only if w(dθ|s) ≥ c/C for all s ∈ (r, ∞), where
which is (2.5) for the case of p(·) = 1. The corresponding integral
(nothing but W(s) for the case of p(·) = 1) has a clear meaning, it is the probability of being the maximal signal,
The following example illustrates that in a general class of distributions such an equilibrium may not be possible because of strong irregularities (pathologies) of the h(·) function, that need not be monotone, nor continuous, nor h(−∞) = 0, nor h(+∞) = 1. Here is the example. Let θ run over integers, that is, G(m−) < G(m+) and G(m+) = G((m + 1)−) for m = . . . , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . . Further, let F(s|θ) = s − θ for s ∈ (θ, θ + 1); that is, F(·|θ) is the uniform distribution on (θ, θ + 1). Then h(·) is a discontinuous periodic function. Namely, h(m + α) = α n−1 for all α ∈ (0, 1) and integer m. Such an erratic behavior of h(·) prevents p(·) from being equal to 1 on (r, ∞), no matter how large is r. By the way, these S 1 , . . . , S n are affiliated.
This example shows that in models where participation in a game is a strategic variable (due to the fact that actions are costly), affiliation plays no role, since it can coexist with a pathology as the one we showed above. The example also shows that trying to obtain results that hold for all distributions is not constructive because in the class of 'all distributions' there are pathologies we do not want to be restricted by. Restricting the analysis to distributions for which the h(·) function, see (3.1), is monotone seems very reasonable.
We believe that restricting attention to equilibria where players with high signals always participate is reasonable, since it means that participants with such signals make positive profits if they win.
From now on, we assume that signals follow the multinormal distribution 8 with parameters a, σ, ρ (σ > 0, 0 < ρ < 1);
It is of the form (1.1), namely, one may take n + 1 independent N (0, 1) random variables Θ, ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n and form
then the joint distribution of S 1 , . . . , S n is multinormal, 9 and (3.3) is verified by a simple calculation. Thus,
where Φ(x) = (2π)
du is the standard normal distribution function. Parameters a, σ are useful in applications, but in the general theory we may restrict ourselves to the case
it means a linear transformation of all signals, harmless when determining the winner, and simplifying formulas. The only parameter that matters is ρ. 8 The multinormal distribution is the finite-dimensional case of a Gaussian measure. "The modern theory of Gaussian measures lies at the intersection of the theory of random processes, functional analysis, and mathematical physics and is closely connected with diverse applications in quantum field theory, statistical physics, financial mathematics, and other areas of sciences." V.I. Bogachev, "Gaussian measures", American Mathematical Society 1998 (see Preface, p. xi).
9 A linear transformation always sends a multinormal distribution into a multinormal distribution.
The relation
. In other words, 11 12 F (s|θ)
which can be verified also by a straightforward but more tedious calculation. We get from (3.1), (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9)
by a change of the variable: for one and only one s high ∈ (−∞, +∞). Consequently, if r ≥ s high , then the strategy "never quit" supports an equilibrium; if r < s high , it does not.
3.12.
Lemma. If r ≥ s high , there exists one and only one 13 symmetric equilibrium, namely, signals s ∈ (r, ∞) always participate.
Proof. First, the function p(·) on (r, ∞), defined by p(s) = 1 for all s, is a symmetric equilibrium by Lemma 2.8, since w(dθ|s) = h(s) ≥ h(s high ) = c/C for all s ∈ (r, ∞).
Second, assume that a function p(·) supports a symmetric equilibrium; we have to prove that p(s) = 1 for F 1 -almost all s ∈ (r, ∞). By Lemma 2.8, it suffices to prove that W(s) > c/C for all s ∈ (r, ∞). Taking into account that
10 The two-dimensional distribution of the pair (Θ, S k ) is equal to that of the pair (S k , Θ); both are the two-dimensional normal distribution with the mean vector (0, 0) and the covariance matrix
Now Θ is one-dimensional, and we may write dG(θ) rather than G(dθ). 12 The expression dΦ For r < s high , an equilibrium (if any) cannot satisfy p(s) = 1 for (almost) all s ∈ (r, ∞). However, it must satisfy p(s) = 1 for almost all s ∈ (s high , ∞), which can be proven similarly to Lemma 3.12 (the second part of the proof). Alternatively, the next lemma can be used.
3.13. Lemma. If a function p(·) on (r, ∞) supports a symmetric equilibrium, and a number r 1 ∈ (r, ∞) is given, then the restriction of p(·) onto (r 1 , ∞) supports a symmetric equilibrium for the game with the reserve level r 1 .
Proof. A function W corresponds (by (2.5), (2.6)) to p and r. Similarly, some W 1 corresponds to p 1 and r 1 , where p 1 is the restriction of p onto (r 1 , ∞). We have p(s 1 ) = p 1 (s 1 ) for s 1 ∈ (r 1 , ∞), therefore W(s) = W 1 (s) for s ∈ (r 1 , ∞), since the right-hand side of (2.5) uses p(s 1 ) for s 1 > s only. The pair (p, W) satisfies the condition of Lemma 2.8 on (r, ∞), therefore the pair (p 1 , W 1 ) satisfies the same condition on (r 1 , ∞).
Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13 are essential in deriving the equilibrium. Lemma 3.12 shows that if the reserve is high enough, a unique monotone equilibrium takes place. Lemma 3.13 stipulates that any two equilibria defined on different segments of the form (s, ∞) must coincide on the smaller segment. Consequently, we may start with an equilibrium on any r > s high and augment it for any r < s high . The fact that an equilibrium unfolds leftward, is crucial in our proof.
The probability of winning and strategies
Extending our analysis to the more interesting and general situation, where r < s high , is more complicated since we must consider the equilibrium strategy in conjunction with the probability of winning,
where w(dθ|s) is defined, for a given p(·), by (2.5). We know that W(s) = h(s) > c/C for all s ∈ (s high , ∞). We also know that s high cannot be replaced with a smaller number s high − ε, that is, for every ε > 0 the inequality W(s) > c/C is violated somewhere on (s high −ε, s high ).
14 One may guess that W(s) = c/C and p(s) < 1 for (almost) all s ∈ (s high − ε, s high ). Note however that it is not proven yet; it could happen that p(s 2n ) < 1, W(s 2n ) = c/C, and p(s 2n−1 ) = 1, W(s 2n−1 ) > c/C for some s 1 < s 2 < . . . , s n → s high . Such bizarre cases should not be ignored, as far as we pursue an equilibrium unique among all strategies, not just some class of well-behaved strategies.
In general, W(·) need not be continuous (recall the discontinuous periodic function in the example of Sect. 3). For the multinormal case we will see that W(·) on (r, ∞) is continuous and moreover, it is (locally) absolutely continuous; it means that the derivative W (·) can be defined (almost everywhere w.r.t. Lebesgue measure) such that
15 In what follows, we investigate properties of W (s) for an arbitrary strategy p(·); equilibrium will appear again only in Lemma 4.15. Equation (4.1) expresses the intricate relation between strategy and the probability of winning,
for s ∈ [r, ∞) (the formula combines (2.5), (2.6), (3.5), (3.8), (3.9)).
Basically, we differentiate in s Equation (4.1) for s ∈ [r, ∞). For a continuous p(·) it is indeed a usual differentiation, but the general case will be treated in a roundabout way (see Lemma 4.12) . True, the equilibrium function p(·) is in fact piecewise continuous; however, the general case is needed when proving uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The variable s occurs twice on the right-hand side of (4.1), namely, at the lower limit of the internal integral, and in Φ
. Indeed, a signal plays two roles, 'internal' and 'external'. On one hand, it informs a player about his strength (the internal role). On the other hand, due to interdependence, it informs a player (to some extent) about other players (the external role). In order to separate the two roles we split the signal in two, s int and s ext , and introduce a function of two variables s int , s ext , denoting it by W 2 : 
16
In what follows we shall decompose s into s int and s ext ; this decomposition may seem unusual. However, this is how we will be able to isolate p(s). As a byproduct, it formalizes the statement we made before, that a higher signal has two aspects to it: good news and bad news.
Assuming for a while that the usual differentiation rules are justified, we get, denoting the normal density Φ (·) by ϕ(·),
Note that the effect of s int is proportional to p(s), which is natural; an increase of s int matters when crossing a competitor. In the total derivative
the first summand is proportional to p(s), the second summand does not depend on p(s), thus the sum is linear in p(s). 17 The linear function is 16 An increase of θ shifts the distribution to the right, which increases the expectation of any increasing function of the random variable.
17 The argument is quite informal. The single value p(s) may be treated as an independent variable, if p(·) is discontinuous at s which, however, makes the usual differentiation rules inapplicable. A correct interpretation of the argument involves a local continuous variation of the function p(·) near s, and a suitable limiting procedure. Anyway, the argument is heuristic, it is not used in the formal proof given by Lemma 4.12. uniquely determined by its values for p(s) = 0 and p(s) = 1; denote these byW 0 (s) andW 1 (s) respectively;
In order to write explicit formulas forW 0 (s),W 1 (s) more compactly, we introduce
for any m, then w(dθ|s) = w n−1 (dθ|s). Taking into account the property ϕ (x) = −xϕ(x) of the normal density ϕ, we rewrite (4.3), (4.4) as
for s ∈ [r, ∞).
Turning from heuristic to rigorous arguments we use right-hand side of (4.9), (4.10) as the definition ofW 0 (·),W 1 (·). Such a definition in terms of integrals does not depend on differentiability of W 2 . Note thatW 0 (·),W 1 (·) are continuous on (r, ∞) (since the right-hand side of (4.8) is continuous in s), andW
The following lemma states formally the relation (4.5) obtained before heuristically. It is very useful in proving our major result; Theorem 5.6. It will help to disentangle p(s).
4.12. Lemma. The function W(·) is absolutely continuous on (r, ∞), and
for almost all s ∈ (r, ∞).
(For the proof, see Appendix A.) Now comes a surprise: a relation that will lead (see Corollary 4.18) to the jump p(s high −) = ρ, of p(·) at s high . We considerW 0 (s high ) andW 1 (s high ) assuming that p(·) = 1 on (s high , ∞).
The proof, given in Appendix A, is a trick based on s int , s ext , W 2 . From now on the reader may forget s int , s ext and W 2 ; they are not used in the rest of the paper. In contrast,W 0 (·),W 1 (·) will be used intensively.
Combining Lemma 4.13 and (4.11) we get
In this section, the next lemma is needed for s 0 = s high only; the general case will be used later. 
holds for almost all s ∈ (s 0 − ε, s 0 ).
Proof. We have W(s) = c/C, therefore W (s) = 0. Lemma 4.12 gives p(s)W 1 (s) + (1 − p(s))W 0 (s) = 0, which implies (4.17).
Considering s 0 = s high , Corollary 4.16 excludes erratic behavior of p(·) in a left neighborhood of s high . Indeed, the right-hand side of (4.17) is continuous.
Corollary. If p(·)
supports an equilibrium then p(s high −) = ρ, maybe after correcting p(·) on a negligible set.
Proof. Due to Lemma 4.13 and continuity of the right-hand side of (4.17),
it remains to use Corollary 4.16. 
Proof. The case r = s high is already understood; here W(r) = h(s high ) = c/C, recall (3.11), andW 0 (r) < 0,W 1 (r) > 0, see (4.14). Let r < s high . We have 0 < p(·) < 1 on (r, s high ) by 5.1(a); W(·) = c/C almost everywhere on (r, s high ) by Lemma 2.8; taking into account continuity of W(·) we conclude that
Now, comes uniqueness (assuming existence, for now). 
18 Of course, the term is auxiliary, intended only for technical use within this section.
19 Recall (4.1), (4.9), (4.10).
Applying Corollary 4.16 to p 1 (·) and s fork we get ε > 0 such that
for almost all s ∈ (s fork − ε, s fork ); hereW 0 (·),W 1 (·) correspond to p 1 (·).
Denoting by X(·) the restriction of p 1 (·) onto [s fork − ε, s fork ] we see that X is a fixed point of a (nonlinear) operator A defined by Proof. Lemma 5.4 gives us ε > 0 and an operator A, the operator being a contraction. Every contraction on a complete metric space has a fixed point. Therefore A(X) = X for some X : [r 1 − ε, r 1 ] → (0, 1). We take r 2 = r 1 − ε and ], and 0 < p(s) < 1 for all s ∈ (s low , s high ], and p(s high ) = ρ, and p(s) = 1 for all s ∈ (s high , ∞), and for every r ∈ [s low , ∞) the restriction of p(·) onto (r, ∞) is an equilibrium strategy; (b) If s low > −∞ then the limit p(s low +) exists and is equal to 0 or 1; (c) for every r ∈ [s low , ∞), every equilibrium strategy on (r, ∞) is equal to p(·) almost everywhere on (r, ∞).
Proof. Denote by E the set of all r ∈ (−∞, s high ] such that (r, p r ) is a wellbehaved pair for some p r (·). By Lemma 5.3, p r (·) is uniquely determined by r. By Lemma 3.13, if r ∈ E and r 1 ∈ (r, s high ) then r 1 ∈ E and p r 1 (·) is the restriction of p r (·) onto [r 1 , ∞). By Lemma 5.5, E has no least element. Clearly, s high ∈ E. So,
for some s low ∈ [−∞, s high ).
Functions p r (·) for all r ∈ (s low , s high ) extend one another; gluing them together we get a function p : (s low , ∞) → [0, 1] such that p(·) is continuous on (s low , s high ], and 0 < p(s) < 1 for all s ∈ (s low , s high ], and p(s) = 1 for all s ∈ (s high , ∞), and for every r ∈ [s low , ∞), p| (r,∞) is an equilibrium strategy. Also, p(s high ) = ρ by Corollary 4.18. Item (a) is proven.
It cannot happen that s low > −∞ and 0 < p(s low +) < 1, since s low / ∈ E. Also it cannot happen that s low > −∞ and the limit p(s low +) does not exist, since p(·) is equal on (s low , s high ] to the function
Item (c) follows from Lemma 5.3.
Consequently, we proved existence and uniqueness of equilibrium; in this equilibrium, high types participate with probability 1. Then, there is a discontinuity and we come to the highest type that uses a mixed strategy. We refer to this type as s high − and prove that he participates with probability ρ. Hence, the lower the interdependence, the bigger the drop from pure to mixed strategy. From then on, there is a segment of signals over which players randomize, and then . . . the participation probability function hits 1 or 0 (unless s low = −∞).
The following questions come to mind:
1. How far is s low from s high ? Namely, after the drop from p(s) = 1 to p(s) = ρ what is the length of the interval where 0 < p(s) < 1.
2. What is the pattern of the mixed strategy on (s low , s high ); does it oscillate. And if it does, how large are the oscillations.
These are questions that typically can not be answered analytically. A numerical analysis conducted in the next section sheds light on some of the issues.
Some numerics
Numerical computation of the equilibrium participation probability function p(·) for given parameters n, ρ, c/C begins with finding s high by solving (3.11) where h(·) is given by (3.10) .
After that we choose ε and find a fixed point of the contraction operator A (see Sect. 5); it is a function on [s high − ε, s high ]. The value of ε ensured by (the proof of) Lemma 5.4 is too small for practical purpose. Instead, we choose by trials and errors ε small enough for iterations X n+1 = A(X n ) to converge quickly. The initial point is the constant function X 0 (s) = ρ for 
Independent signals
In this section (in contrast to all other sections) we assume that signals are independent, and consider both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. The game is still symmetric; it is the contest game, and signals are identically distributed.
What matters for a player, is his quantile F 1 (S k ) rather than signal S k . Indeed, only order relations between signals are used. It means that the distribution F 1 of each signal does not matter, as far as it is nonatomic (that is, the c.d.f. F 1 is continuous). Restricting ourselves to the nonatomic case, we may assume that F 1 is the uniform distribution U(0, 1) or, equally well, the normal distribution N(0, 1). The latter case, F 1 (s) = Φ(s) for s ∈ (−∞, +∞), is just the special case ρ = 0 of the multinormal distribution.
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However, the former case, F 1 (s) = s for s ∈ [0, 1], is a bit more convenient here, since it allows us to use A k S k similarly to (2.1).
The probability h(S k ) of being the maximal signal (recall (3.2) ) is now
which is much simpler than (3.1). Equation (3.11), h(s high ) = c/C, is easy to solve:
Similarly to Lemma 3.12 (but simpler), signals above s high always participate (for every equilibrium). What happens below s high ? Corollary 4.18 suggests that p(s high −) = 0. However, the complicated machinery of normal correlation is out of place here. The threshold strategy p(s) = 1 for s > s high , 0 for s < s high (7.1) supports an equilibrium, since the corresponding winning probability function The indifference opens the way to some asymmetric equilibria. Say, player 1 participates always, while other players adhere to the threshold strategy (7.1). Moreover, player 1 may use an arbitrary function p 1 (·) below s high .
In order to exhaust all equilibria, we have to prove that no more than one player can deviate from the threshold strategy.
The proof is simple. Assume the contrary; say, players 1 and 2 both deviate from (7.1). It means that the support of (the distribution of) the random variable A 1 S 1 intersects the open interval (0, s high ); and the same for A 2 S 2 . Moreover, each intersection contains more than one point (due to nonatomicity).
Take s 1 , s 2 ∈ (0, s high ), s 1 = s 2 , such that s 1 belongs to the support of A 1 S 1 , and s 2 belongs to the support of A 2 S 2 . Assume that s 1 < s 2 (the other case is similar). Consider the winning probability function W 1 (·) of player 1. We have W 1 (s) < W 1 (s high ) for s < s 2 ; indeed, there is a chance that max(A 2 S 2 , . . . , A n S n ) = S 2 ∈ (s, s high ). So, W 1 (·) < c/C near s 1 . Therefore p 1 (·) = 0 near s 1 (recall 2.8), and s 1 cannot belong to the support; a contradiction. 
